By Professor Ladipo Adamolekun,
Retired executive of the World Bank
These are Jottings and Notes on Nigerian affairs written during my years in international development work. Although they are mostly commentaries on past events covering 1987-2000, they have relevance, in varying degrees, for the country’s present and future.
ON “CYNICAL TENDENCY” IN NIGERIAN POLITICS
The term, “cynical tendency” used in the lead article of West Africa (London) of July 13, 1987 appears to have a close relationship to the so-called “Militant Tendency” within the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. However, unlike the British parent term that stands for the orientation of a fringe or marginal group, the “Cynical Tendency” in Nigerian politics is probably a mainstream phenomenon. After the experiments with several forms of government under eight heads of state within 27 years, the average Nigerian would be behaving in a perfectly rational manner if he/she were instinctively cynical towards politics and politicians.
For some curious reasons, Nigerian military political leaders resent being described as politicians. I have always been struck by the distance they deliberately seek to establish between themselves and the politicians. Yet, the country has been ruled by military leaders during 18 of 27 post-independence years. It is only logical that they should share responsibility with civilian politicians for whatever might be the negative features of the Nigerian political culture that needs to be changed. There is a real sense in which the military political leaders’ “holier than thou” attitude vis-à-vis civilian politicians constitutes a strong factor pushing the average Nigerian to the “Cynical Tendency” school. After “collecting” or “seizing” power five times and actually running the government for two-thirds of the time, successive “corrective” military governments have not succeeded in turning things around. Why should anyone believe that the period 1987-1992 constitutes Nigeria’s magic dates with destiny, as the incumbent Babangida Administration is promising?
Although president Babangida speaks only of the “dawn” of a new era, it still amounts to a variation on the theme of a “new Nigeria” that most of his predecessors, both military and civilian, who had promised Nigerians, as if it could be achieved by the magic wand of rhetoric (Obasanjo’s “humane African society”) or dignified inaction (Shagari’s “ethical revolution”). However, a significant difference is Babangida’s apparent awareness of the prerequisites for the successful establishment of a new social order in the country. His summary of the prerequisites is largely accurate: “In our search for solutions in the past, we considered beautiful institutional arrangements without the supporting values which would make these institutions work. We tried to find approximate solutions to immediate and approximate problems without adequate attention to long-term problems which call for long and gradual but solid solutions. One of the cardinal tasks of this administration, therefore, is to bring about a new political culture which, like a veritable fountainhead, will bring forth a stable, strong, and dynamic economy.”
President Babangida’s diagnosis and prescription call for three comments. First, he is correct in making the observation that “beautiful institutional arrangements” will only work when the necessary values are present within the society where the institutions are expected to function. Second, his assertion that Nigeria needs a new political culture that would ensure congruence between institutional arrangements and societal values is incontrovertible. The third point to make relates to president Babangida’s mistaken view that his Administration can actually “bring about a new political culture” for Nigeria. His error here is typical of the assumption of the “men on horseback” (and their praise singers) who believe that the “resolve and certitude characteristic of [our] military profession’ (Babangida’s words) can successfully carry out social and political engineering within a few years. Political history teaches us that Babangida’s faith has no foundation whatsoever.
Pleading guilty to the charge of cynicism in advance, I wish to assert that by 1992, the Babangida Administration would not have brought about a new political culture in Nigeria. However, what we will find out between now and 1992 is whether the Babangida Administration would have taken steps that will begin to lay the foundation for the emergence of a new political culture whose salient features will be capable of sustaining a stable political order by the time Nigeria celebrates fifty years of nationhood in 2010.
– July 1987.
CO-OPTING THE CO-OPTABLES: THE BABANGIDA STYLE
During a brief visit to Ife on July 8th, two former colleagues observed that I would have become a co-opted associate of the Babangida administration if I had not left the country in January 1987. At first, I protested but I later gave in. Yes, one key element in Babangida’s political style is that he has co-opted all the cooptables. Since I know several of those who have been co-opted, I am aware of the various motivating factors: genuine commitment to national service; self-fulfilment (usually following dissatisfaction with current job); personal ambition (material gain, fame); sharing in the exercise of power (whether from the corridor or in the bedchamber). And there are those who self-recruit themselves through sheer opportunism and sycophancy.
Predictably, two or more factors could be present in the case of any given individual. Thus, by July 1988, the co-opted associates of the Babangida administration included articulate Nigerians who would normally qualify to be placed in any point on the political spectrum from the extreme left to the extreme right. But there were already signs that a few key co-opted associates could opt out before long: social critic Tai Solarin had been berating the Minister of Education for months while Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, had raised loud opposition to the proscription of ASUU. Yet the nation was informed that all the activities of the Minister of Education enjoyed the full blessing of the President.
Undoubtedly, Babangida’s co-optation strategy has succeeded admirably. But in that success lie the seeds of future problems. Since a “Maradona” cannot continue scoring goals for ever (with or without the “hand of God”), the strategy will progressively become less and less effective. More importantly, the exit of a few key co-opted associates will deal a serious blow to the reputation of the regime. Will Babangida resort to increased arbitrariness or come up with another winning strategy? The former is almost certain to bring about his fall while the latter could ensure his survival to the proclaimed rendezvous of 1992.
– July 1988
BABANGIDA’S NIGERIA, MARCH 1989
After ten days of visits through Lagos, Oyo and Ondo states and several conversations with a cross-section of the citizenry, mostly members of the intelligentsia, I have come to the conclusion that the undeclared motto of the Babangida’s regime is: “Enrichissez-vous” (Get Rich). Yes, the president is the general overseer of a system of wealth sharing that seeks to take care of all those who, through one kind of connection or another, can “corner” for himself or herself a share of the national wealth. Patronage appointments into the Armed Forces Ruling Council, the cabinet, governorship positions, and the various leadership positions in parastatals, the civil service, the foreign service, and other government agencies are made with a conscious and deliberate plan to spread the access to some wealth among as many “key” persons as possible.
There are four major consequences of Babangida approach to governance. First, it presents the appearance of a broad-based, almost national government in which all regions, religions, ethnic and professional groups are represented. A few of the current “ins” are undoubtedly talented and dedicated and would qualify to be members of any randomly selected “government of talents” for the country (for example, Ransome-Kuti, Aminu, Falae, Larry Koinyan…). But there is no coherent, well-thought-out policy orientation to which the core of the ruling group subscribes. The structural adjustment programme (SAP) is probably the overarching policy framework but its various dimensions and interconnectedness are understood by only a handful. Indeed, key members of the core-ruling group undermine aspects of SAP by their acts of omission and commission. Equally significant is the way in which sectoral policies (education, health, transport, industry, energy etc.) bear the mark of individual ministers without the necessary linkages and interrelationships being given attention.
Second, because the president appears to be tolerant of each member of the “in” group making himself “comfortable”, the cautious, hesitant acquisition of material well-being embarked upon by each member in the first couple of years of the regime has progressively become very blatant and the size of acquisition has increased dramatically. The “demonstration effect” at the federal level is enthusiastically copied at the state level and it is also extended to many local governments. While this is not quite the same as the “looting” system of the Shagari era, it is a system of corruption (abuse of office for personal wealth and/or use of patronage to share public wealth among cronies) that could seriously compromise the chances of success of the SAP programme.
Arising from the first and second points, it does not appear that the management of the economy would benefit from some of the opportunities offered by SAP. The patronage system of appointment results in many square pegs in round holes in certain critically important posts (finance, budget, planning, science and technology) and several appointments to parastatals are not likely to produce positive results for the organizations concerned. It is possible that some pockets of good management exist but the overall situation is likely to be one of general mismanagement.
The fourth and final consequence of the Babangida style of governance is the significant defections from the ranks of critics who could either articulate alternative options for society or serve as the conscience of the mass of the population. For the first time in Nigerian political history, a large proportion of the articulate members of the mass media, the intelligentsia (academics, the professional associations) and the trade unions have been co-opted into the “ins” group, resulting in muted critical assessments of the regime. While this could be interpreted as the beginning of a broad-based “Establishment”, the negative characteristics of the Establishment’s current behaviour – institutionalized corruption and lack of a real direction for society – give cause for concern.
– March 1989.