Nigeria and the Botswana elections,-By Kehinde Yusuf

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*Photo: Professor Kehinde Yusuf*

On 30 October, 2024, the opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) led by Duma Boko defeated the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) which had been the ruling party since 1966 when the country gained independence. The incumbent President Mokgweetsi Masisi of the BDP who was seeking a second term in office, having first assumed office in 2018, conceded defeat before the vote count was completed, and called and congratulated the winner, Duma Boko.

On 1 November, 2024, Masisi said: “For now, the evidence is overwhelming. We lost this election massively … And we need to come to terms with it, and make space and give opportunity to the newly elected leaders, and respect them and support them, so that they can succeed, because it’s Botswana’s success that’s most important.” He also declared: “Starting from tomorrow or, as in my discussion with the President-Elect, at a time convenient to him, we will begin all administrative work to facilitate the transition and I assure you that I will not take any actions to hinder or slow down this process.”

Interestingly, it was former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan who was appointed as the African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) for the Botswana elections, and Masisi’s experience must have resonated with him. In 2015, President Jonathan had himself lost a presidential election, in Nigeria, to a new party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), that was formed from a fusion of some opposition parties and elements. Like Masisi, he had conceded defeat before the completion of the tallying of votes, and had congratulated Muhammadu Buhari, the candidate of the APC.

In President Duma Boko’s first public speech on 1 November, 2024, he said that he was not just the President of UDC, but of the whole of Botswana. He also remarked: “I pledge with every fiber of my being that I will do everything I can not to fail, not to disappoint, appreciating always the enormity of the responsibility bestowed upon me by the people of this republic. It is their government … and I approach it with all the humility I can muster. And so, that is why I lay myself open to criticism. Even if it is acerbic and fierce and vicious, I’ll listen and heed and try always to do what is right for the people, by them and for their country.”  

At a meeting he and Masisi held with senior government officials on 5 November, 2024, the new President also said: “Botswana has demonstrated to the whole world that the accolades that we’ve enjoyed as a shining example of democracy were more than well-deserved. … [If] I had respect, and I did, for the former President, my respect for him reached the stratosphere. … We may not appreciate the seriousness, the enormity and the profundity of what he has done.” He noted that if it had been in some other countries, they would have been “embroiled in conflict, civil strife, because an incumbent refuses to accept an outcome.” He then remarked with adulation: “Not in Botswana. Not with this former President. And for that we are eternally grateful.”

Three noteworthy features of the Botswana elections are Diaspora Voting, Early Voting and Independent Candidacy. Diaspora voting allowed registered citizens of Botswana to vote in their countries of residence outside Botswana. Early voting was limited to and allowed election and police officers (who are normally on duty on election day) and Diaspora voters to cast their votes before 30 October, 2024. Independent candidacy allowed citizens who did not wish to be affiliated with any political party to contest elections, and one independent candidate actually won in last week’s national assembly elections. Nigeria has lessons to learn from Botswana, which is a country of 2.7 million people, with respect to these admirable features of multi-party politics.

It would be highly beneficial for Nigeria, like Botswana, to adopt the advance voting system and expand its beneficiaries to include election officials, security personnel, local observers, transporters, journalists (who are often posted outside their registration areas or constituencies during elections), and just about any eligible voter who, for one reason or the other, may prefer the option. Moreover, introducing Diaspora Voting into the Nigerian system would be of immense value, especially if the opportunities for it to be abused, manipulated or undermined could be curtailed. Furthermore, making provision for independent candidacy in the Nigerian electoral system, as is the case in Botswana, would expand the democratic space.

On 30 October, 2024 in Botswana, local government elections were held concurrently with the parliamentary and presidential elections, indicating a mainstreaming of the local government elections and administration, and leaving little room for the kind of obscene manipulation of local elections by state governments that is being witnessed now in Nigeria. If there’s still merit in having elections on two days, Nigeria should consider having local government, State Houses of Assembly and governorship elections on the same day, subsequent to making the tenure of local government administrations four years.

In Botswana, as pointed out in the South African Development Commission (SADC) Electoral Observation Mission (SEOM) report on last week’s election, voter accreditation was done manually, thereby elongating the process. This is unlike Nigeria’s electronic voter accreditation system which reduces accreditation time considerably. Moreover, in Botswana, as SEOM noted, votes were not counted at the respective polling stations where the votes were cast, but were conveyed to designated counting/collation centres. This exposes the votes cast to sundry risks including ballot box snatching, ballot box stuffing and malicious votes destruction. In the Nigerian system, these risks are minimised, because votes are counted and the results are announced at the polling stations, and party agents are issued official copies of the results instantly.

From the official results issued after counting votes at a polling station, as happens in Nigeria, a party has a fair chance of knowing its relative overall performance, even before the official declaration of final results. Moreover, counting votes at polling stations reduces the risk of results alteration or falsification; and where such electoral fraud occurs, and the victims choose to challenge the fraud at an election tribunal or court, the official results issued at the polling stations come in handy as significant evidence. It would therefore be beneficial for Botswana to adopt this time-tested system.

Botswana witnessed a “seismic” election result and a “whirlwind” transition of power. The President-Elect was sworn in in a simple closed-door ceremony in the office of the Chief Justice, a few hours after the concession of defeat. So, as the victor assumed office immediately, the person the people of Botswana knew as President in the morning of 1 November, 2024 had become “former President” a few hours later, on that same day. The public inauguration followed, a week later, on 8 November, 2024.

President Duma Boko had earlier contested and lost elections for president in 2014 and 2019. After each defeat, he girded his loins and continued the struggle. Neither he nor his supporters marched to the Botswana Defence Force (equivalent of the Nigerian Army) headquarters to incite the army to takeover government. And neither did they set up a global propaganda machinery to defame their country nor set up a complex web of sabotage to bring Botswana down. And they didn’t ascribe all of their troubles to the desire by the ruling party to create and perpetuate a one-party state.

In the 2009 general elections, the BDP won 45 out of 57 parliamentary seats (where 31 seats were required to be declared winner). The remaining 12 seats were shared among 4 opposition parties. In the 2014 elections in which Duma Boko’s UDC, formed in November 2012, contested for the first time, BDP won 37 seats, UDC came second with 17 seats, and another party won the remaining 3 seats. In the 2019 elections, BDP won 38 seats, UDC again came second with 15 seats, and the remaining 4 seats were shared by 2 other opposition parties. Then came the fateful 2024 elections and, by the morning of 1 November, UDC had won 35 seats, and BDP had won a mere 4 seats, making Duma Boko President. The heroism, tenacity and focus of Duma Boko and the UDC provide a great model for Nigeria’s jumpy and inconstant, nectar-seeking opposition.

In a congratulatory message, Nigeria said: “As Botswana remains an important ally and partner, Nigeria shares the hopes and aspirations of the brotherly government and people of Botswana, as they delve into the next chapter of their nationhood.” It is hoped that the country would assiduously promote its strategic interests in Botswana, as Nigeria has a lot to learn from it with respect to the protection and management of mineral resources and animal husbandry. The latter is particularly important due to Nigeria’s creation of the new Federal Ministry of Livestock Development.

As former British Prime Minister Theresa May reminded us, “compromise is not a dirty word.” This is what Botswana’s former President Mokgweetsi Masisi may have realised so clearly now, considering the effect of the very high level of acrimony and mutual grandstanding between him and Ian Khama. Crisis had developed between Masisi and Ian Khama who was his immediate predecessor and whom he had served as Vice-President from 12 November, 2014 to 1 April, 2018. Khama said that the crisis resulted from the disloyal and autocratic tendencies of Masisi, but Masisi said that it resulted from Khama’s attempts to interfere with and undermine Masisi’s government.

At the peak of the reconciliation-shunning crisis, Khama had to go into exile fearing for his freedom and for his life. He then boasted that having made the big mistake of supporting and handpicking the ‘deceptive’ Masisi as president in 2018, he was going to ensure that Masisi did not get a second term in office in 2024. So, for the 2024 elections, Khama campaigned vigorously around the country, especially in BDP strongholds, not necessarily for his own Botswana Patriotic Front to win, but for Masisi’s BDP to lose. With the loss of Masisi’s second term bid in the elections that held on 30 October, 2024, Khama’s threat has proved to be no mere grandstanding.

It would be recalled that a 17 December, 2023 article titled “Wike and Khama; Fubara and Masisi,” in this column, highlighted the correspondence between the feud between the former Governor of Nigeria’s Rivers State, Nyesom Wike, and his successor, Siminalayi Fubara, and the one between Botswana’s Ian Khama and Mokgweetsi Masisi. As Khama threatened to stop his successor Masisi from getting a second term of office as president in 2024, Wike boasted that Fubara would not get a second term as governor in 2027. Khama’s threat has proved to be no empty boast. Will Wike’s also be more than huffing and puffing? Time will tell.

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