By Samuel Aruwan
*Photo:Samuel Aruwan*
In Nigeria’s war against banditry, the most dangerous weapon is not always in the hands of those pulling the trigger. It is in the hands of those who pass the information. These persons can compound and complicate all efforts.
For several days, colleagues repeatedly forwarded a video of Governor Umar Radda lamenting how informants across different spheres are making the fight against banditry in Katsina State more difficult. In the clip, he recounted that within five minutes of concluding a high-level security meeting, a notorious bandit had already been briefed on its outcome.
The question that immediately arises is quite unsettling. How does such sensitive information travel that quickly? Many who sent the clip to me were doing so from a place of innocent curiosity, but not without a hint of expectation. They knew I had at one time been a member of the State Security Council and assumed I understood the inner workings of such meetings. Having watched the clip several times, I noted that the governor was specific in referring to a high-level security meeting, and not a State Security Council session, or in fact a Core Security meeting, which handles day-to-day security issues of the state. Pointedly, however, he did not elaborate on the composition of the meeting or the class of attendees. The distinction is significant, and I will briefly address it.
From what I observed, there was no allegation that the leak came from security forces. Instead, the governor pointed to elements within the communities, accusing some of collaborating with bandits instead of supporting the state and security forces. In elaborating on the broader scope of the menace, the governor subtly indicated that moles exist across all sectors.
There are high-level security meetings that involve traditional rulers, religious leaders, youth and women’s group leaders, market and business unions, community-based organisations, and other stakeholders. These meetings are usually about mobilising support for security forces on specific concerns, and they also serve as a form of civil-military cooperation. Heads of security agencies attend these meetings, but they only make comments when necessary, and that is mostly on a need-to-know basis, without reference to operations. Their contributions are often limited to assurances and readiness to respond to distress calls.
In this sort of meeting, there is no strict control of attendance, and criminally inclined individuals from communities who attend may quickly glean some information and relay such to bandit kingpins. In Hausa, they may say, ‘yau an tattauna yadda za a yi maganin ku ko kuma a fara kai muku hari’, meaning ‘there was a discussion on how to deal with you or launch offensive actions against you.’ Such communications, when intercepted by intelligence officers, may refer to the meeting and create assumptions about moles within the system. I must, however, be clear that this does not completely exonerate bad elements within government or security forces. It only reflects a pattern I have observed.
Another type of high-level security meeting at the state level may be convened by a governor or at the instance of the President during serious conflicts. These meetings may involve the President or Vice President, Service Chiefs, the Inspector General of Police, General Officers Commanding, and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force. Victims or parties involved in the conflict may also be present, sometimes alongside media and social media broadcasting live. In such situations, even when operational details are not explicitly stated, the pathways and directives given may signal that operations could follow. Criminals and their accomplices pay close attention to these developments and adjust their actions accordingly to evade state response or move to softer targets.
There are also instances where security activities are unintentionally exposed through the media, which can trigger terrorists to change tactics. For example, military simulations, battle inoculations, or tours showcasing weapons and capabilities, which should ideally remain outside the public domain, sometimes dominate media coverage. Terrorism is highly planned and organised, often executed based on a precise understanding of the target. Any media exposure that gives adversaries insight into the strength or disposition of security forces in a location must be carefully managed. What should dominate the media space are successes against the enemy, not displays of combat readiness or details that may aid the adversary.
Back to the issue. What the governor’s remarks reveal is a deeper and more troubling reality. Informants play a significant role in complicating counter banditry efforts across Northern Nigeria, often to the advantage of adversaries. Drawing from my observations, it is possible to identify several categories of informants operating within the banditry ecosystem, each shaped by different motivations, pressures, and loyalties.
In conventional security thinking, an informant is simply a source of intelligence for the state. As Farida Waziri noted in her book ‘One Step Ahead: Life as a Spy, Detective and Anti-Graft Czar’, an intelligence officer must have an ear to the ground. The more credible informants available, the more effective the system. However, within the realities of Nigeria’s banditry crisis, the concept is far more complex. Informants are not always aligned with the state. In many instances, they are active enablers of criminal and terrorist networks, as their actions expose security operations and aid attacks against the state and its citizens.
In this context, an informant can be understood as anyone who provides sensitive and confidential information about state activities, such as troop movements or operational plans, to bandits, terrorists, or other armed groups. Some go further by identifying high-value targets for abduction, which I describe as ‘Targeted Kidnapping.’ They provide assessments of the targets’ economic worth and background information that bandits use to negotiate ransoms with the victims’ families. These informants are often deeply involved in providing logistical support that strengthens such groups.
Within this landscape, the first category comprises state-aligned informants who gather intelligence and report to security agencies. The second consists of criminal-aligned informants who provide information to bandits or terrorist groups. A third category includes double agents who supply intelligence to both sides. Many individuals within this third category are financially motivated. They alert the state to possible threats while quietly passing similar information to criminal groups, and at times, present false or fabricated intelligence. Both sides may see value in the intelligence provided, while the source benefits from both. In such cases, loyalty is not to the state or any cause, but to personal gain.
Beyond financial motives, there exists a more complex and coercive category of informants. Some individuals are compelled to provide intelligence to bandits, particularly on the movements of security forces, as a way of securing their own safety or that of their communities. Conversely, others provide information to security agencies as a form of self-exoneration, to avoid being labelled as collaborators.
Finally, there are patriotic informants who, driven by a sense of duty and commitment to their communities, voluntarily supply intelligence to the state. These individuals often operate at significant personal risk. I know many community leaders and individuals we have lost in this patriotic sacrifice, as they were killed by bandits for resisting and exposing them.
What emerges from all this is a hard truth. Nigeria’s anti-banditry campaign is being fought on two fronts, one visible and the other largely hidden. While security forces confront armed groups in the field, a quieter battle is taking place within the intelligence space, where compromised individuals continue to aid the enemies of the state with valuable information.
Beyond mere leaks, this points to a deeper structural weakness. Even informants aligned with the state, when poorly vetted, inadequately protected, or driven by fear and economic desperation, can expose intelligence systems to risk. Channels meant to secure operations can easily be turned against them.
Addressing this problem requires more than reactive measures. It calls for a deliberate effort to disrupt how terrorist and bandit groups source, recruit, and manage informants. At the same time, there must be stricter accountability within security structures, stronger safeguards for credible informants, and better incentives for those who provide reliable information.
Intelligence operatives must deepen their engagement within communities to strategically identify these criminal informants and ensure their effective prosecution. At the same time, there must be diligence in avoiding the wrongful labelling of citizens as informants, especially in cases driven by personal feuds or vendettas. There have been instances where individuals deliberately frame those with whom they have disputes as informants, just to gain an advantage or set them up for harm. There have also been instances where personnel involved in handling complex security situations are deliberately framed. Such practices not only endanger innocent lives but also distort intelligence gathering and undermine the credibility of security efforts.
In a similar twist, there have been allegations that bandit networks deliberately use informants to undermine security personnel who actively disrupt their activities. In such cases, bandit-aligned informants allegedly circulate false accusations of misconduct, human rights violations, corruption, or unprofessional behaviour against officers and troops who are known to be very effective. The objective of these allegations is simply strategic blackmail aimed at discrediting, demoralising, or triggering administrative sanctions against personnel who constitute obstacles to criminal operations. Many times, subsequent investigations have revealed that such claims are fabricated or unsupported by evidence. This dynamic further underscores the complex intelligence environment in counterterrorism operations. Informant networks can serve not only as valuable sources of actionable intelligence but also as instruments of deception and psychological pressure against security forces.
These trends are not without precedent. In his book ‘In the Name of Victor: Confronting Errors with the Truth’, Lieutenant General Victor Malu, former Chief of Army Staff of blessed memory, recounted how, during the February 2000 Sharia crisis in Kaduna, he received a presidential directive, conveyed through the then Minister of Defence, General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, to remove the General Officer Commanding, 1 Division, Kaduna, Major General Alexander Ogomudia. Malu requested permission to meet President Olusegun Obasanjo over the directive.
Malu stated that he was not prepared to “sit passively and silently” while an officer who had acted on superior orders faced unjust, career-ending consequences. On meeting the President, it became clear that the decision was driven by pressure and allegations that the GOC had taken sides during the crisis. Malu maintained that these claims were unfounded and pointed out that they were contradicted by detailed operational reports already forwarded to the Presidency, though it was his understanding that they had not been properly reviewed.
He stated that the officer had performed competently and professionally, referred to a letter of commendation he had issued, and insisted that nothing warranted a reversal of that assessment. He also stated that operational decisions should not be influenced by political considerations, stressing that the actions taken were based on directives from Army Headquarters and the realities on the ground.
Malu stated that if confidence in his leadership had been lost, he should be told who to hand over to. Following that engagement and a clearer understanding of the facts, the directive was dropped, and the GOC remained in position. He later rose to become Chief of Army Staff and subsequently Chief of Defence Staff under the same administration.
This episode shows how decisions taken under pressure, or without proper consideration of available information, can lead to flawed outcomes, particularly in sensitive security situations.
Beyond policy, there is also a human cost. Every compromised operation is not just a strategic failure. It puts lives at risk. Security personnel are exposed, communities are left vulnerable, and ordinary citizens are caught between violent groups and a system struggling to protect them. If these criminal informant networks are not dismantled, the consequences will persist. Operations will continue to be anticipated, ambushes will remain likely, and public confidence in the state’s ability to provide security will continue to decline.
In the end, the fight against banditry will not be won by force alone. It will depend on whether the state can secure its information as well as its territory, because in this conflict, what is known, who knows it, and when they know it can determine everything.
*Aruwan is a postgraduate student at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and former Commissioner Home Affairs and Internal Security in Kaduna State